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Before the advent of democratic rule in South Africa, most people had
expected the country to experience an explosion of politicized ethnicity
when minority rule was replaced. Yet this has not come to pass, and
ethnic political parties have declined in number and influence in post-
apartheid South Africa. Instead, between 1994 and 1999 partisan
politics developed in a multipolar direction, with some parties
embracing racial mobilization and others attempting to build multi-
ethnic, non-racial entities. This article explains these developments as a
product of the ways that political parties have responded to the incen-
tives established by political institutions, on the one hand, and the
structure of social divisions, on the other. The analysis holds impli-
cations for our understanding of the ways in which social cleavages in
ethnically divided societies become politically salient, and for the lessons
of institutional and constitutional engineering, particularly with respect
to how proportional representation systems interact with other factors
to shape politics in ethnically diverse societies.
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Introduction
Are ethnically divided societies doomed to replicate their societal divisions
in the political arena? Is it possible to prevent the emergence of ethnic
political parties in a society with deep communal cleavages? If it is possible,
what are the most efficient mechanisms for achieving this goal? The effec-
tiveness of constitutional engineering in mitigating the effects of communal
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divisions has been the subject of great debate in both academic and policy
circles. Discussions often hinge on the type of electoral system most appro-
priate to prevent the emergence of divisive ethnic conflict in divided
societies.1 Within this debate, analysts have devoted most of their attention
to the relationship between ethnic divisions, electoral systems, and the
nature of political parties and political competition. For example, in 1985,
Donald Horowitz posed the question of whether imposing an electoral
system based on party-list proportional representation (PR) with large
multi-member constituencies and no cut-offs for minority parties could
prevent the emergence of ethnic parties in a plural society (1985: 649).
Posed offhandedly within a large chapter on political parties and ethnic
conflict, Horowitz provided a short answer to the negative.
The treatment of ethnic divisions and political parties, however, needs
to be expanded on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically,
the discussion must begin to include the effect of the structure of govern-
ment, whether it is federal or unitary, on the relationship between ethnic
division and political party development. Most analysts discuss federalism
when assessing mechanisms to reduce the stakes of political competition,
rather than as an instrument to shape the form that political competition
takes in the first place. Thus, the debate of federal versus unitary states
enters the discussion at the level of conflict-resolution measures.2 Yet the
nexus between electoral rules and the level on which parties compete
(national, regional, or local) holds enormous implications for the types of
social cleavages that political parties will attempt to exploit as they seek
political power.
The argument for the importance of federalism gains further importance
based on the experience of South Africa between 1994 and 1999.
Considered by many to be an archetypical ‘deeply divided society’, post-
apartheid South Africa has witnessed a dramatic decline in the number of
explicitly ethnic political parties. This trend renders the South African case
a critical test of the relationship between electoral systems and party
systems, because South Africa’s past history of deep ethnic and racial
divisions has made it a crucial case for studying the emergence of ethnic
parties. Experts on electoral systems had anticipated that the country’s
permissive PR electoral system would spur the country to develop an ethni-
cally fragmented party system. Area specialists with their deep knowledge
of the country had expected ethnic politics to emerge once White domi-
nation had been removed. The fact that this has not occurred has been
explained in current analyses as the result of a ‘natural’ political party
alignment in a country that had experienced decades of race-based
discrimination.
An explanation based on the experience of racial discrimination, however,
overlooks critical variables in the development of the South African political
party system. This type of explanation overlooks the proximate cause of
political agency: opposition party leaders made conscious decisions to turn
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away from strategies that exploited potential ethnic divisions within the
ruling African National Congress (ANC), and instead embraced a variety
of strategies. Party strategists made these decisions in response to under-
lying factors that included ANC’s attempt to narrow the ideological
spectrum, the incentive structures created by the interaction of a closed-list
proportional electoral system with a weak federal structure, and the struc-
ture of social cleavages in South Africa.
Between 1994 and 1999 opposition politics in South Africa have devel-
oped in a multipolar direction, rather than along purely race-based lines.
The general political cleavage that has emerged runs along an African
minority divide that belies ethnic diversity on both sides. Political mobiliz-
ation has emerged in this pattern primarily in reaction to the structural
factors listed above: the electoral system, federal system, and demographic
divisions of South African society. In South Africa, the interaction of a weak
federal and permissive electoral system created incentives that led parties to
construct large electoral coalitions capable of delivering national rather than
sub-national level representation.
Once the political institutions set this incentive, particular parties set
about constructing support blocks out of the most easily manipulable
societal cleavages, given an individual party’s situation in the political
marketplace. Given these incentives and constraints, party strategists turned
away from the long-term goal of stealing supporters away from the ANC,
and instead focused on challenging each other for the small pool of voters
outside the ANC’s traditional support base. Thus, the Democratic Party
(DP) and New National Party (NNP) attempted to define political
competition along lines based on the overlap of race and class divisions,
while other parties, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), responded to
these incentives by attempting to move beyond a purely ethnic appeal.
Based on this analysis of South Africa between 1994 and 1999, this article
presents theoretical arguments of broad significance for several lines of
research. First, political elites in countries with sharp ascriptive cleavages
develop strategies in response to incentives generated by political insti-
tutions and social demographics, just as political parties do in countries
without these divisions. Second, the article contributes to the literature on
ethnic politics, since it highlights the ways in which various aspects of the
institutional structure of South African politics have worked against the
emergence and maintenance of ethnic political parties. Finally, the analysis
makes the broader claim that scholars of party systems and electoral systems
need to develop research agendas that analyze the interaction of electoral
and federal systems. In South Africa, these two sets of rules created joint
incentive structures that in turn shaped the strategic choices of political
parties in seemingly counter-intuitive ways, a dynamic that is likely to be
reproduced in a variety of other settings.
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The Ethnic Implosion that Never Came
Many analysts now consider the supposed racialization of post-apartheid
South African politics to be a natural occurrence. Yet this assessment can
only be made by completely disregarding the widespread predictions that
ethnic conflict would replace racial divisions in post-apartheid South Africa.
Analysts predicted that, once in power, the ANC would splinter along ethnic
lines, similar to what had happened to the Zambian Movement for Multi-
party Democracy (MMD) in the 1980s, and following the pattern witnessed
in many African countries in the 1960s.
Accordingly, the most intense debates over designing a post-apartheid
political system revolved around the issue of how to construct an electoral
system that would not exacerbate ethnic conflict. On the one hand,
advocates of a proportional, power-sharing system argued that the model’s
inclusiveness would allay the fears of domination and exclusion that the
minority groups would feel once White rule had ended (Lijphart, 1993).
Advocates of a plurality electoral system argued that the centralizing
tendency of this system would force parties to make broad appeals, resist-
ing the incentives for the reification and Balkanization of ethnic differences
that the proportional or consociational approach would inevitably foster
(Horowitz, 1991). While differing in their prescription, advocates of
both sides proceeded from the common diagnosis of the problem, namely,
that South Africa would witness a sharp increase in divisive ethnic mobiliz-
ation after the liberation struggle was over (Horowitz, 1991: 85; Lijphart,
1985: 122).
The electoral system under which South Africa finally achieved demo-
cratic rule could have made these expectations a reality. South Africans ran
the 1994 and 1999 elections under an electoral system that employed a
closed-list PR formula (the Largest Remainder Droop formula) without a
threshold. As a result, in both elections several parties gained entrance into
the National Assembly (NA) with less than 1 percent of the national vote.
The ability to win representation in the NA with such small numbers could
very well have encouraged parties to mobilize the small ethnic constituen-
cies spread throughout the country.
Despite permissive electoral rules, however, the number and influence of
ethnic political parties have decreased in the post-apartheid scenario. Most
of the small Coloured, Afrikaner, and African parties that existed in 1994
had disappeared by 1999. Even large ethnic parties like the New National
Party (NNP – the party that created apartheid and once the staunch
advocate of the Afrikaner volk), and the IFP (the political vehicle for the
Zulus), shifted their appeals away from their narrow ethnic focus, such that
in the campaigns for the 1999 elections both of these parties rarely appealed
explicitly to ethnic interests. Instead of ethnic mobilization, race-based
mobilization seemed to become the principal dividing line in the 1999 elec-
tions. Parties like the NNP and DP, rather than competing with the ANC
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for the support of African voters, fought amongst themselves for the
‘minority vote’ – Whites, Coloureds, and Indians.
The IFP, which throughout its existence had gained political influence
through its ability to mobilize Zulus and control the area that is now the
KwaZulu–Natal province, moved away from a purely ethnic-based
platform. In place of its long-standing emphasis on the status of the Zulu
monarchy, respect for traditionalism and the rights of amakhosi (traditional
leaders), the IFP’s 1999 election campaign focused on a broad conservative
platform (family values, anti-crime, anti-corruption, and a ‘revolution’ of
goodwill), targeting potential supporters in virtually all population groups.
The IFP virtually never brought up its traditional issues outside the deep
rural areas of KwaZulu–Natal.
The trend continued among the smaller and new parties. In its 1999
campaign, the Pan Africanist Congress attempted to shift its ‘Africanist’
stance from its historically pro-Black position to include anyone whose
primary allegiance was to the continent of Africa. The newcomer in the race,
the United Democratic Movement (UDM), attempted to build a non-racial
coalition, and thus avoided explicitly ethnic appeals in all provinces (though
cloaked appeals surfaced in the Eastern Cape). The Africa Muslim Party
changed its name to the Africa Moral Party.
Thus the widely feared ethnic explosion did not occur. The explanation
offered in this article rests on a number of factors, but places primary
emphasis on the ways that party strategists responded to institutional incen-
tives created by the interaction of a federal state weakened to the point of
unitarism and a permissive electoral system. Together, these factors created
a joint incentive structure that decreased the payoffs of appeals to small
ethnic groups. The data for this argument will be presented through case
studies of the NNP, DP, and IFP in the period from 1994 to 1999, culmi-
nating with an analysis of their campaigns for the 1999 elections.
Determinants of Party Systems: Institutional and Social
Factors
Electoral Rules and the Structure of Government
The conventional wisdom in comparative literature is that in countries with
multiple and divisive social cleavages PR electoral systems often create frag-
mented political party systems based on ethnic and other ascriptive identi-
ties. Because electoral rules can raise or lower barriers to entry in the
political system, they determine the nature of electoral coalitions needed to
win seats in legislatures, which in turn influences both the number of parties
and the type of support base needed to win seats. Whether or not votes need
to be concentrated in geographical districts, the central difference between
PR and majoritarian constituency models affects the nature of mobilization
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necessary to gain representation (Horowitz, 1991; Lijphart, 1994;
Mozaffar, 1995; Reynolds, 1999; Reynolds and Reilly, 1997; Sartori, 1994).
This article is concerned with the ways in which electoral rules shape
strategies of partisan mobilization and affect party system fragmentation
(Cox, 1997). The debate on the relationship between party systems and
ethnic mobilization focuses most often on the choice between a permissive
PR system and a centralizing plurality-based system. Permissive electoral
systems, by lowering the number of votes needed to gain entrance into legis-
latures, facilitate the representation of small parties, and thus are considered
to provide incentives for political entrepreneurs to cultivate small electoral
coalitions based on small and marginal groups. In contrast, systems with
more strict standards for representation, such as those requiring majorities
concentrated in geographic constituencies, tend to weed out smaller parties,
forcing parties to cultivate larger, more encompassing constituencies.
Electoral institutions thus directly affect strategies of mobilization. First-
past-the-post plurality (FPTP) electoral systems will often induce parties to
campaign on issues that will be of concern to a broad audience, since the
party needs to win over either a plurality or majority of the citizens in a
geographic district. In contrast, under PR systems, if the district magnitude
is not too small, parties can seek to mobilize particular constituencies that
may be geographically dispersed, seeking to gain seats in the legislature
based purely on the number of votes that this group can deliver. In this way,
PR can provide incentives for exclusive appeals and mobilization of distinct
groups.
In this literature, the structure of government figures centrally as a
solution to mitigate ethnic conflict, once it has already surfaced. Federal
systems have received most attention for their potential to devolve power
and reduce conflict in countries with geographically-based divisions, such
as regional rivalries, ethno-territorial groups, or concentrated religious
minorities. Federal systems are viewed as solutions in these situations
because creating more tiers of government increases opportunities for
groups to obtain representation in government and defuses the intensity of
competition for power at the center (Coakley, 1993).
Yet the structure of government and the form of the executive also influ-
ence strategies of political mobilization, especially ethnic mobilization, a
dynamic that receives comparably little attention in the academic literature.3
This oversight represents a fundamental neglect, because federal systems can
shape party systems in very direct ways. A federal system that genuinely
devolves power will cause parties to compete for power at lower levels in
the political sphere, fostering the development of regional or local political
parties. This dynamic creates incentives for parties to mobilize smaller or
larger constituencies, sized appropriately to the level of power for which the
party contests.
Federal systems could thus increase the politicization of ethnic or other
regionally concentrated groups, because at lower levels of political
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competition these groups become rewarding support bases. Nigeria serves as
a prime example in this regard, where states were created to give ethnic
groups increased control over their affairs. The creation of states then led to
the political activation of even smaller ethnic groups that had not been
relevant when the administrative unit was larger, which in turn fueled
demands for further state creation (Ayoade, 1986; Diamond, 1988; Suberu,
1991).4 Unitary systems, in contrast, by focusing competition for power on
the national level where small ethnic groups do not present large electoral
rewards, provide incentives against the mobilization of small groups. Instead,
nationally focused political competition under unitary systems more often
seeks out the median voter. Presidential and parliamentary systems similarly
affect the focus of political competition, with presidential systems, like
unitary organization, focusing party politics on the national arena.
The debate on party systems and ethnic mobilization needs to bring these
two aspects together (Bermeo, 2002). These two factors interact with each
other in a dynamic way to shape party system development in divided
societies. Taken together, electoral rules and the structure of government
create interacting incentive structures to which party elites respond when
deciding where to focus scarce resources in the struggle to gain political
representation. This joint incentive structure in turn interacts with the
dimensions of social cleavages to shape mobilization strategies as parties
attempt to craft support coalitions capable of providing the votes necessary
to win legislative representation at the designated level.
Social Divisions
One of the oldest tenets of comparative politics is that political parties in
many countries originated in societal conflicts, with the result that the
cleavage structure of society is often reproduced in the party system (Lipset
and Rokkan, 1967). Social divisions, whether they cross-cut or cumulate,
will affect the malleability of political mobilization. If most divisions
reinforce each other, then parties do not have much room to maneuver as
they seek to construct new support bases. If, however, social divisions cross-
cut each other, parties have more latitude as they attempt to construct
winning support blocks. Additionally, once parties decide on target groups,
the geographical concentration or dispersal of these communities will
impact on the locus of political competition and party campaigns. Finally,
the relative size of groups, in relation to the level of power for which parties
compete, will affect whether parties seek to aggregate groups into larger
political units, or to differentiate groups from each other.5
In ethnically divided societies, the expectation is that ethnic divisions will
inevitably be reproduced in political party systems (Horowitz, 1985). The
logic for this approach combines the emotive aspect of the primordial under-
standing of ethnicity as an ascriptive identity with the more instrumentally-
based acknowledgement that sociological variables like membership in an
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ethnic group create common group interests that shape party coalitions and
define perceptions about which parties are attuned most to the needs of
various social groups (Berelson et al., 1954; Lazarsfield et al., 1948). When
translated into the party system, these common group interests form the
bases for political parties.
While the original social cleavage model of party development treated
parties as passive receptacles that simply took social divisions as given, a
subsequent wave of revisionist models considered political elites capable of
shaping cleavages in society through their strategies and behaviors (Claggett
et al., 1982). Revisionist theorists considered the lines of conflict to be more
malleable than the original social theorists, and argued that different sets of
cleavages could be activated in response to changing policies and coalition
strategies among party leaders.
The compromise position between the old and revisionist theories argues
that while political elites have the ability to politicize and depoliticize social
cleavages, these divisions and the political parties based on them will
succeed in the long term if they are based on fundamental social cleavages.
Both models describe different facets of the same process. The strategies and
tactics of elites provide the initial mobilization along a particular line of
conflict, but whether that dimension becomes an enduring political cleavage
depends on whether there is a receptive social base for it. The dual notions
that parties rest on social bases and that elites have some ability to manipu-
late social divisions into political cleavages endure (Claggett et al., 1982:
653–4).
Political Institutions and Social Demographics in South
Africa
Political Institutions
In South Africa, the electoral system and the federal system work to concen-
trate power at the national level without requiring parties to obtain
geographic or constituency-based support. Elections for provincial and
national legislatures in South Africa are held concurrently at five-year inter-
vals, and both are based on closed-list PR with no specified variable thresh-
old and extremely large districts (the entire nation being the district for
national elections, and each province the district for provincial elections).
Thus, the electoral system creates an extremely low threshold that in both
1994 and 1999 allowed some parties to win seats in the NA with less than
1 percent of the national vote.
Once in parliament, an anti-defection clause built into the constitution to
protect the proportionality of the electoral system, prevented members of
political parties from switching sides. If a member of a party wished to
switch to another party, then the receiving party had to remove one of its
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own parliamentarians and replace him or her with the defecting member,
so that the overall balance of power between the parties remained the same.
In practice, this clause prevented members of small opposition parties from
joining forces with the ANC, which helped the opposition to retain its
strength. This clause also strongly discouraged opposition realignment
between election periods, out of a fear that either merging or disbanding
would lead to their members losing their seats.6
One of the major concessions that the ANC had made during consti-
tutional negotiations in 1995 and 1996 concerned the character of the state.
Favoring a unitary state, the ANC conceded to the NP’s insistence on some
form of federalism, and eventually the parties agreed on a federal state
divided along the national, provincial, and local levels. South Africa’s
particular brand of federalism, however, reflecting the ANC’s reluctance to
implement this arrangement in the first place, created provinces with
extremely limited abilities for autonomous policymaking and priority
setting. Each of the nine provinces has some degree of control over provin-
cial affairs, but the vast majority of major social and economic policies,
decisions over taxation and other resources with which a party can reward
supporters are made at the national, rather than provincial, level. For
example, provinces have extremely limited taxation power and over 95
percent of their funds are disbursed to them through the national govern-
ment (Wehner, 2000).
Important policies are generated at the national level, and implementation
occurs primarily at provincial and local levels. Provinces could have
developed some autonomy in implementation through prioritization and
budgetary allocations, but the national government pre-empted such
attempts by establishing performance targets that provinces had to meet in
such areas as housing, education, and policing, and by controlling where
the provinces spend their budgets. In specifying where and how different
portions of the provincial budget should be spent, the national government
sets many of the policy and spending priorities for the provinces. When
combined with the concurrent scheduling of provincial and national elec-
tions, this institutional structure builds in enormous incentives to organize
nationally, and little reward to mobilize on local or provincial bases. As a
result, parties seeking to build nationwide support bases from which to chal-
lenge the ANC regard control over provincial administrations as less
important than influence in the NA.
Social Divisions
South African society is complex and multilayered, with multiple divisions
along the lines of race, ethnicity, class, and religion, to name but a few. In
the South African context, race and ethnicity refer to separate concepts.
Race groups refer to the four population categories established by the
apartheid policies of the former government: Black (used interchangeably
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with African) refers to people belonging to ‘tribes’ indigenous to the area;
Coloureds are those of mixed ancestry; Indians refers to people of South
Asian descent; and Whites are Europeans who are ‘obviously’ white.
Whereas racial categories are based on visual (and incendiary) criteria,
ethnic distinctions encompass communities grouped by cultural and linguis-
tic differences. Thus, English, Xhosa, Afrikaner, and Zulu are all ethnic
groups (see Table 1).
South Africans self-identify themselves as members of ethnic groups more
frequently than racial. When asked in an open-ended question to indicate
the primary groups with which they identify, only 22 percent of South
Africans reported racial categories, with more South Africans reporting
their ethnic groups (29 percent) and almost as many citing religion (19
percent) as race.7 The high salience of religion, third overall, was notable,
especially because of its non-politicization in national politics.
Within each racial category, the primacy of ethnic and religious identifi-
cation renders their relative non-politicization even more surprising (see
Table 2). Given that much of South African political discourse takes place
along a White–Black, previously advantaged–previously disadvantaged
dichotomy, this primacy of ethnic over racial identification is notable. In
part, this social latency arises from the overlap of racial and class groups.
Together, they create racially bounded groups that provide easy targets for
parties seeking to build support on the national level. For example, consider
the relationship between class and race, using occupation as a proxy for
class membership. Figure 1 groups South Africans according to occu-
pational categories roughly corresponding to class groups. Each tier is
divided into its racial composition, after which it becomes obvious how
Africans cluster in the lower rank, while the professional class is over 50
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Table 1. Racial and ethnic groups in South Africa
Racial groups % Ethnic groups %
Africans 77.42 Zulu 22.87
Whites 11.03 Xhosa 17.89
Coloureds 8.95 Afrikaner 14.45
Indians 2.60 Pedi 9.19









Source: Statistics South Africa, Census in Brief (1996).
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percent White. These trends, demonstrating a sharp racial basis to class
position, are reproduced in education, income, and other socio-economic
measures.
Each of the four racial groups thus occupies a distinct position in the
country’s socio-economic structure. This positioning generates similar
material interests for each group, making them easily mobilized, large
blocks of potential supporters. The least educated, those employed in the
least skilled occupations and those earning the lowest wages, are all dispro-
portionately African. Class composition becomes more diverse the higher
the class rank, but even in the highest tier White South Africans are dispro-
portionately represented.
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Table 2. Self-identification of South Africans classified by racial groups
Africans Whites Coloureds Indians 
(n = 1665) (n = 301) (n = 179) (n = 55)
Ethnic category 37.2% 9.2% 0.5% 65.5%
Race 18.4% 15.1% 46.7% 0.9%
Religion 18.2% 11.2% 28.8% 16.2%
Class 4.9% 48.6% 17.0% 6.0%
Occupation 3.6% 4.6% 1.7% 11.4%
Source: Idasa Southern African Barometer Survey. The figures represent the percentage
response within each racial group to the question, ‘Besides being South African, which group
do you feel you belong to?’







































Figure 1. Racial composition of class measured by occupation category
Source: Statistics South Africa, Census in Brief (1996).
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The resulting overlap of class and race creates large communities, delim-
ited by race, that share many common characteristics. Other apartheid
policies, such as the Group Areas Act, also guaranteed that many South
Africans lived in segregated communities. This not only reinforced the
perception of shared interests, but also created racially bounded infor-
mation networks (Mattes, 1995), further adding to the political importance
of race as a tool for political manipulation, even if it does not dominate
other bases of personal identity. The alignment of race and class also makes
it possible to issue cloaked appeals to race groups through carefully
constructed messages that raise specific interests, especially important in a
society where blatant appeals to race have been de-legitimized. Thus, race
combined with other factors renders it one of the most easily mobilized and
most encompassing social divisions, one that easily overwhelms ethnic and
religious mobilization.
Finally, the geographic distribution of South Africans also plays a role in
how parties pick and choose from the available menu of mobilization
strategies. While Black/African South Africans are spread relatively evenly
throughout the country’s nine provinces, members of racial minority groups
tend to cluster in specific provinces. For example, three-quarters of Indians
reside in KwaZulu–Natal. The Coloured population lives almost entirely in
three provinces: Gauteng, Western Cape, and Northern Cape. White South
Africans are the least concentrated of the minority groups, yet still have
concentrations in Gauteng, KwaZulu–Natal, and Western Cape. Parties
seeking to court the racial minority vote would thus be more likely to
concentrate their campaigns on particular provinces, rather than spreading
the message evenly, as would a party focused on the African vote. These
provincial concentrations help partially to mitigate the nationalizing effect
of the weak federal system. Yet, since only two provinces have populations
where racial minority groups are in the majority (Northern and Western
Cape), targeting the minority vote in most provinces is not a winning
strategy useful for winning provincial governments outright.
Taking all these factors together, this article proposes an interactive expla-
nation that in South Africa between 1994 and 1999, parties responded to
these institutional and social incentives to turn away from ethnic mobiliz-
ation as a viable strategy in national and provincial elections. Ethnic groups
were too small to present lucrative political support bases when parties were
concerned with winning influence at the national level. As a result, no party
sought to activate any of the divisions that either cross-cut the racial groups
or had the potential to reach into the support base of the ANC.
Political Mobilization in South Africa, 1994–99
The major political parties, the ANC, NNP, DP, and IFP, reacted to the inter-
active incentive structure in different ways. The ANC worked to ensure that
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the political identification spawned during the anti-apartheid struggle
became cemented as the dominant partisan cleavage in the post-apartheid
era. Throughout the 1994 to 1999 period, the ANC alternated its rhetoric
between a Black–White, formerly disadvantaged versus formerly advan-
taged dichotomy, in a conscious effort to insulate itself against inevitable
disappointments with performance and to reinforce popular perceptions of
the ANC as the sole legitimate representative of the interests of the masses
(usually defined as Black). ANC leaders knew from the past experiences of
liberation movements throughout the continent that the integrity of the
party’s support base would not be immune from encroachments by ethnic,
regional, or religious entrepreneurs as the unity of the anti-apartheid
struggle wore off. Therefore, much of the party’s rhetoric aimed to remind
people of the struggle and to reinforce the political Black–White dichotomy,
even though racial identities, as previously discussed, did not dominate over
other forms of personal self-identification among South Africans between
1994 and 1999.
By advancing this political rhetoric and by manipulating other elements
of the political system, the ANC helped to prevent the fractionalization of
its diverse support base into competing ethnic, racial, and religious units.
Racial, ethnic, and class group memberships overlapped enough to render
the two nations characterization plausible on a broad scale. The ANC also
used its close relationship with the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) to neutralize
threats stemming from the left, thus narrowing the ideological spectrum on
which opposition parties could campaign. In these ways, the ANC worked
diligently to narrow the organizational and mobilization strategies that
opposition parties could feasibly pursue.8
More importantly for the purposes of this article, however, is the fact that
the major opposition parties did not even attempt to mount a challenge to
the ANC on any of these competing platforms. Parties could have utilized
mobilization tactics that worked against the cumulative nature of the socio-
economic cleavages by mobilizing people at either extreme: the multi-racial
well-to-do, or the increasingly mono-racial rural poor. Courting ethnic,
religious, and regional support had the potential to enable parties to build
local support bases. Parties like the NNP, DP, and IFP, which could have
advanced either ethnic or regional platforms, chose instead to challenge the
ANC at the national level on national issues.9
Given the national focus of power, an electoral system that did not require
geographic concentration of support, and the ANC’s huge majority in the
national parliament, winning just a few seats in the NA did not cede a party
any real influence. Parties like the Freedom Front (FF), PAC, and ACDP, all
of which had seven or fewer members in parliament between 1994 and
1999, barely made any impact on national policymaking. Therefore, in
order to win enough seats to have any influence on policy in the NA, when
generating campaign strategies for 1999, most parties eschewed small-group
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(ethnic) mobilization and ran campaigns aiming for nationwide support and
large electoral returns.
Election Campaigns of the NNP, DP, and IFP10
Evidence for this thesis can be found when looking at the electoral
campaigns of the NNP, DP, and IFP. Before the 1999 general elections, the
NNP had been the major opposition party in the country, and the DP a
small party with seven representatives in the NA. After the June 1999 elec-
tions its position was reversed and the DP with 38 seats (compared to the
NNP’s 28 seats) became the second largest party in South Africa. The IFP
waged a campaign from a position as the ruling party in KwaZulu–Natal
province, and with an electoral base of rural Zulus in KwaZulu–Natal and
migrant hostel workers in Gauteng. In their campaigns for the June 1999
national and provincial elections, all three parties prioritized maintaining
or attaining influence at the national level, rather than remaining or
becoming regional forces.11 All three eschewed ethnic appeals to their
traditional constituencies (Afrikaners for the NNP, English-speaking Whites
for the DP, and Zulus for the IFP) in favor of other tactics.
The ‘New’ National Party12
Wracked by internal divisions, organizational problems, a leadership
vacuum, and losing support in its traditional safe strongholds, the renamed
NNP faced an uphill battle as the campaign season for the 1999 elections
approached. The party had engaged in an intense debate in 1996 and 1997
about its future. Moderates had argued that the National Party (as it was
then called) should fundamentally change its nature, with proposals varying
from a reorientation of the party’s support base to the complete dissolution
and recreation of the organization. Yet the anti-defection clause had worked
against the party insiders attempting to change the basic nature of the party,
because many party leaders feared that fundamentally changing the party
would cause it to lose all representation in national and provincial legisla-
tures. By late 1997, the only change was the addition of ‘New’ to the name
of the National Party and the adoption of a vague Christian Democratic
ideology.13 Therefore, at a time when the party was discredited with a high
proportion of the population, institutional incentives played a determining
role in the party’s rejection of a radical change.
Instead, in advance of the 1999 election, the NNP sought to create a
nationwide, multi-racial support base that would enable it to remain the
leading national opposition party. It turned away from appeals to Afrikaner
interests, attempting to redefine ‘Afrikaner’ to include Coloureds, and to
shift its appeals to a broad conservative platform. It also decided not to
build its identity around regional issues specific to the Western Cape and
Gauteng, despite indications that the NNP retained a solid support base
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only in Gauteng and the Western Cape. Instead, it aimed to maintain its
place as a national party, advocating national interests. Therefore, the NNP
set two national goals for the 1999 elections: to end ANC dominance by
preventing the ANC from attaining a two-thirds majority in the NA, and
to maintain veto power in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).
In order to achieve these goals, the party targeted minority voters in all
provinces, making a point of having national leaders attend rallies in every
province. Creating a broad party of racial minority voters, in addition to
advancing the strategic focus the party had adopted in 1997, had the poten-
tial to deliver short-term electoral results and national level representation.
Members of minority racial groups had constituted the bulk of the very
large undecided vote – the potential swing voters – and thus were the most
de-aligned from partisan politics on the eve of the 1999 election (Idasa,
1998). These groups, spread throughout the country, were concentrated in
four provinces (the Western Cape, Northern Cape, Gauteng, and KwaZulu–
Natal), leading to NNP spending most of its campaign resources on party
organization in these provinces.
Even in the context of provincial campaigns, however, the focus was on
national level returns. First, the NNP explicitly elevated national over local
appeals, and chose not to pursue an identity as a regional organization.
Virtually all of its campaign rhetoric focused on national-level issues, with
the occasional ‘Keep the Cape in Shape’ slogan thrown in for good measure.
The Western Cape was the only province where localized slogans surfaced.14
Where provincial campaigns became fiercely competitive, it was because the
parties were fighting over the concentrations of minority voters who lived
in those provinces. Second, the goal of controlling a province outright versus
preventing the ANC from controlling a province had important implications
for the type of support base a party had to construct on the provincial level.
A campaign to win votes solely within minority groups could prevent the
ANC from controlling a provincial administration, but would not enable a
party to gain control of any provinces except for the Western Cape and the
Northern Cape. Winning control over most provincial governments would
have required that the NNP build a more multi-racial support base that
earned significant support from African voters. Thus the different goals,
conditioned by the overall incentive structure of the national political insti-
tutions, affected the types of groups that the NNP sought to mobilize, even
within the context of provincial campaigns.
Rather than reaching out to African voters or consolidating support
among Afrikaners, the NNP sought to gain the loyalties of racial minority
groups, broadly defined. Such a strategy could potentially pay off given the
institutional structure and demographic divisions in South African society.
The PR system increased the payoffs of a strategy that targeted pockets of
White and Coloured communities spread throughout the country, while the
unique socio-economic positioning of each group made it possible to
emphasize issues that each would find particularly salient, such as crime,
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affirmative action, education, and language policy, without making explicit
reference to race.
The Democratic Party
As with the NNP, the DP’s primary goal was to prevent the ANC from
winning a two-thirds majority in the NA and sufficient support in the
provinces to change the Constitution unilaterally. The party also aimed to
become the leader of the opposition. Once the DP set its primary election
target as becoming the leading opposition party, it had to rapidly increase
its support base, since it had won only 1.7 percent of the national vote in
1994 (Reynolds, 1994). Given limited resources, the party could not target
potential voters indiscriminately.
In pursuit of these goals, DP explicitly tried to shed its image as a party
of liberal, White English speakers, shifting its rhetoric to become the
champion of Afrikaners and other minority groups dissatisfied with ANC
governance. DP campaign strategists accorded highest priority to winning
over a block of voters who could enable the DP to gain enough seats to
become the national leader of the opposition, the Afrikaner support base of
the National Party, spread out among more than four provinces. An obvious
strategy, if the electoral system had required geographic concentration in
vote distribution and the provinces had sufficient power to offer the spoils
of office, would have been for the party to wage an all-out war to win
control of the Gauteng and the Western Cape provincial governments, and
not expend much effort in other provinces where the party could not hope
to win enough votes to influence provincial level administrations. Instead,
the DP aggressively targeted racial minority communities dissatisfied with
ANC governance, regardless of where they lived, especially focusing on the
uncertain and independent voters within minority racial groups, such as
Indians in KwaZulu–Natal.15
The DP, to an even greater extent than the NNP, pursued racialized patterns
of political mobilization. DP organizers openly admitted that they were not
targeting Black South Africans, planning instead to court these voters in the
next national elections, scheduled for 2004.16 Strategists self-consciously
targeted members of the minority racial communities because they were easily
mobilized, shared material interests, and had the potential to deliver large
electoral returns capable of guaranteeing national level influence. The Demo-
crats knew that they would not waste resources by targeting these groups
wherever they were located in the country. Therefore, the DP turned away
from courting its traditional English-speaking constituency and instead shifted
its support profile to become a broadly defined, racial minority party.
To win the support of these communities within a campaign that operated
in every province, the party campaigned most heavily where its target
groups lived: the urban and suburban areas within Gauteng, the Western
Cape, and KwaZulu–Natal. The emergence of a regionally focused
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campaign followed a logic similar to that of the NNP: the DP had to focus
on some provinces because its target audiences were concentrated in them,
and it also aimed to keep certain provincial administrations beyond ANC
control in order to create a veto on ANC power in the National Council of
Provinces (NCOP).
As with the NNP, where fierce competitions emerged over particular
provinces, the fight was more for national power than control over provin-
cial governments per se. One example of the primacy of the national over
provincial can be found in the fact that DP campaign strategists prioritized
the Gauteng campaign over the election in the Western Cape. Strategists
considered the Western Cape an easier target to win than Gauteng, since
the ANC was not dominant in the Western Cape, while the ANC controlled
the legislature in Gauteng. Nevertheless, the party focused on the Gauteng
campaign, DP leader Tony Leon admitted, because it was ‘already strong’
there and could obtain more votes overall.17 Contributing to this decision,
the DP felt that the NNP would be able to keep the ANC from controlling
the Western Cape government, so to advance the overall goal of reducing
ANC national hegemony, the DP did not need to use its scarce resources on
a campaign geared to win control over the Western Cape. Instead, the party
could concentrate on winning pockets of wealthy minority voters in the
province and not waste resources fighting the NNP and ANC.
One additional note is in order on the logic of provincial campaigns and
its influence on the strategies of mobilization the parties pursued. Provin-
cial elections were fought on the principle that the NNP and DP desired to
prevent the ANC from gaining unilateral control in the National Council
of Provinces (NCOP). Membership in the NCOP is determined by which
parties control provincial administrations, so ‘keeping the ANC out’ became
a distinguishing slogan in several provincial contests (Gauteng, Western
Cape, and Northern Cape). The goal, however, did not require that the NNP
and DP themselves win control over the provincial administration, just that
the ANC be forced to govern in coalition with other parties, or that a coali-
tion of minority parties control the province.
The Inkatha Freedom Party
Of all the major players in South African politics between 1994 and 1999,
the IFP had been the most ethnically and regionally based, locating virtu-
ally all of its support within the confines of one province, KwaZulu–Natal,
and over 90 percent of its support from one ethnic group, the Zulus
(Reynolds, 1994). The NNP and the DP responded to the incentive struc-
ture in ways that moved them from ethnic to racial or multi-racial patterns
of mobilization. Similarly, the IFP reacted to the same pressures by attempt-
ing to shed the party’s exclusive Zulu appeal and to build a national follow-
ing based on social and economic conservatism. Unfortunately for the IFP,
the party’s decision to follow these tactics came too late in the 1994 to 1999
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period to make a significant positive impact on the party’s levels of support.
After the 1999 elections, the IFP found that its late shift of tactics had cost
it votes and weakened the party in relation to the ANC.
Like the other major opposition parties, the IFP responded to the national
concentration of power by attempting to increase its influence on the
national level, rather than purely seeking to control power within its core
province, KwaZulu–Natal. The party had learned, as the leader of the
KwaZulu–Natal administration, that controlling a province was not
sufficient to remain an influential player in South African politics, nor did
it necessarily enable a party to govern effectively or distribute patronage
resources. The IFP publicly complained at many points between 1994 and
1999 that the lack of genuine power in the provincial administration tied
its hands when attempting to govern KwaZulu–Natal, and party leader
Gatsha Buthelezi made it public knowledge that he considered the provin-
cial government to be practically powerless in many substantive areas.18
Over the previous five years, the party had also discovered the uncertainty
of relying on an ethnically defined vote based on Zulu South Africans. The
ANC had been encroaching on the party’s support base in KwaZulu–Natal,
not just in urban but also in rural areas.19 Therefore, when the national
elections team set the party’s strategy for the 1999 elections, the IFP put an
unprecedented effort into the national campaign, aiming to establish a
national following by generating pockets of support in a number of
provinces outside of KwaZulu–Natal. Estimates are that the party put more
resources into the national level campaign than the provincial, leading one
analyst to conclude that ‘perhaps the most striking feature of the IFP’s
campaign was not just that it had national and provincial components, but
that the national component was so well developed’ (Piper, 1999: 149). The
PR system meant that such a strategy could have worked for the party, for
all it needed to do was to establish pockets of support throughout several
provinces, which could have contributed to the national portion of the
party’s vote and hence an increased number of seats in the NA. Other parties
had successfully based their campaigns on the rationale that this system
could deliver them support from pockets of racial blocks spread through-
out the country.
When selecting target audiences to achieve these election goals, the IFP
followed in the footsteps of the other parties by focusing on undecided
voters, primarily from minority groups in Durban and in provinces outside
of KwaZulu–Natal. The IFP targeted these groups more through the focus
of its mobilization efforts than by issuing race-specific appeals, taking the
gamble of pursuing non-Zulu based support through a campaign platform
based on conservative economic policies and devolution of power. Like the
DP and the NNP, the range of issues that the party advocated in its national
campaign most likely resonated more with Whites and Indians, whose
socio-economic status would render them more open to free-market and
anti-crime messages. Aside from the party’s last-ditch attempt to portray
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itself as the only ‘majority based’ party that defended minority interests, the
IFP rarely issued any explicitly racial or ethnic appeals outside of rural
KwaZulu–Natal.20
Unlike the previous two parties, the IFP did try to encroach on the ANC’s
support base by campaigning among rural voters in provinces outside
KwaZulu–Natal, targeting them with messages about tradition and family
values and contrasting the IFP’s conservative platform with the ANC’s
liberal stance on social issues. Though the IFP’s efforts met with little success
in areas outside KwaZulu–Natal, it is notable that the party even tried to
expand its base into a traditionalist rural vote, absent the overtones of
‘Zulu-ness’. It most likely would not have made this attempt in a
constituency based system, where the geographic spread of rural voters, and
the ANC’s dominance in most rural areas of South Africa, renders this a
risky campaign strategy.
Thus, in South Africa, the interaction of different political institutions and
social demographics conditioned party strategies to downplay ethnic
mobilization. There are many competing social identities in South Africa,
yet most of these have remained politically latent in the post-apartheid era.
Political parties responded to the nationalizing pressures of political insti-
tutions by turning away from ethnic or other small-group appeals. Such
appeals simply could not deliver large enough electoral rewards, especially
when juxtaposed against the overlap of racial and class group divisions that
generated large, easily mobilized constituencies.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the first point that should be made is to acknowledge the
miracle that South Africa was able to prevent the emergence of ethnic
conflict and a divisive ethnic party system, despite Horowitz’s pessimistic
prediction that a divided country could not do just that with its type of elec-
toral system. This is, undeniably, an optimal outcome for a country that had
been riddled by deeply divisive communal divisions for decades. The fact
that one can discuss ‘normal’ politics in South Africa, where parties compete
in free, fair, and relatively peaceful elections, owes a great deal to the
conflict-reducing effects of the country’s political institutions and spirit of
national reconciliation.
Yet there is a price to pay for this stability in terms of the vibrancy of
political debate and future evolution of the party system. The pure PR
system, originally designed to prevent the permanent exclusion of racial and
ethnic minority groups, has in fact interacted with the federal system to
guarantee that if parties do not change their strategies members of minority
racial groups will be permanently marginalized in South African politics.
The current path of party politics involving the major political parties,
the NNP, DP, IFP, and ANC, follows a line of increasing racial polarization
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that has helped to suppress the emergence of intra-Black ethnic politiciza-
tion. The ANC’s relationship with COSATU and the SACP plays no small
part in this trend. The break-up of that alliance is a factor that needs to be
addressed in any discussion of future developments, yet which unfortunately
demands treatment beyond what can be accomplished in this article.
The short-lived merger of the NNP and the DP, the Democratic Alliance
(June 2000 to October 2001), only exacerbated these tendencies and rein-
forced popular perceptions of the parties as outdated vehicles of elitist,
minority interests. The IFP attempted the transformation away from an
ethnic appeal too late in the 1994 to 1999 period to render its non-ethnic
appeals convincing, with the result that the party failed to break out of
its ethnic base and further weakened its position both regionally and
nationally.
A different mix of political institutions could have exerted the conflict-
reducing tendencies of South Africa’s current institutions without leading
the country into more open politics. A different electoral system, perhaps
combining elements of constituency and proportionality principles, could
have forced political parties to seek support from among the country’s Black
voters.21 This not only would have avoided ethnic mobilization, but would
also have discouraged the racial mobilization that has become the signature
of opposition politics in South Africa.
Ceding more powers to the provinces, making them more attractive
spheres for representation, could make them more important to opposition
parties. If this were to happen, an eventuality that seems unlikely given the
ANC government’s empowering of local governments at the further expense
of provincial in late 2000, it could spur the development of more regional
parties that advocate specifically regional interests. Adopting this strategy
would force parties to seek support from a broader spectrum of voters. De-
linking provincial and national elections, a more costly option than the
current concurrent system, would also raise the stakes of provincial
contests. This could help to break the deadlock of South African partisan
politics.
The theoretical implications travel beyond South Africa. First, in
ethnically divided societies, it is often assumed that ethnic identities
dominate the formation of political parties, and that parties simply repre-
sent the political arms of ethnic groups. The South African case shows that,
even in societies considered to be ‘deeply divided’, personal identities are
multilayered, and that political institutions play a large role in determining
which social identities will be activated into partisan cleavages.
Second, PR systems will not automatically create politics of the lowest
common denominator. Political parties, in consideration of the electoral
system and tier of power for which they want to contest, have latitude in
deciding whether or not to pursue identity-based mobilization, and if they
pursue such tactics, they then can select the particular identity from a variety
of options. This study stresses the fact that even in deeply divided societies
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the translation of social identities into partisan divides is not automatic,
contra the predictions of Horowitz and many others.
The third major theoretical contribution of this analysis is that the elec-
toral system is not the only important institutional variable in the process
of politicizing ethnicity. Electoral rules interact with other structural factors,
institutional and demographic, to shape party agency. Certain political insti-
tutions can work against the fragmentary pressures of a PR system, so that
even if parties can appeal to small ethnic communities they may not necess-
arily do so. In South Africa, the result has been to keep ethnic identities
latent and to elevate the salience of racial divisions that could and should
have subsided in the post-apartheid period.
Overall, the analysis suggests that more consideration needs to be given
to the ways in which various political institutions interact within a political
system to shape the lines of political competition. These interactions may
produce unanticipated and counter-intuitive results. In many societies,
whether deeply divided or not, there actually may be far more room for
constitutional and institutional engineering to structure the lines along
which political competition will develop than has been discussed. The issue
is not merely proportional versus constituency based electoral systems, but
also concerns federal systems, the tiers of power for which parties will
compete, and the relative size of communal groups in a country.
Notes
The opinions and analysis expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not
reflect the official position or policy of the government of the United States of
America.
1 See, for example, Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral
Engineering for Conflict Management (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2001) for one of the most recent and comprehensive works on the subject.
2 Horowitz (1985) provides a prime example of this focus, as does Benjamin Reilly
in ‘Electoral Systems for Divided Societies’ (Journal of Democracy 13: 156–70).
As an example, in his recent book on conflict management in divided societies,
Benjamin Reilly never discusses the way that federal and electoral systems
interact to shape development of political parties and the bases on which they
campaign.
3 The notable exception here is the work on federalism in Nigeria discussed below.
4 Suberu (1991) noted that the creation of additional states in Nigeria created
strong feelings among ethnic communities that the only way to achieve
modernization and benefit from the ‘national cake’ was by having their own
states, which in turn led to a growth of ‘aggressive subnationalism’ as more and
more groups demanded states be created to accommodate their interests.
5 This is an insight adapted from my own work in South Africa, but see Ayoade
(1986) and Suberu (1991) on Nigeria and Posner (2003) on Zambia.
6 In late 2002 and early 2003, the anti-defection clause was modified to allow for
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a two-week window in which members of local, provincial, and national legis-
latures could switch parties without losing their seats. The full effects of this
constitutional amendment have yet to be felt, but the early indications are that
the window periods advantaged the ANC more than the opposition.
7 The question was part of a survey administered in July–August 2000 by the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), ‘Besides being South African,
which group do you feel you belong to?’ Answers mentioning language or ethnic
groups were coded as the ethnic category; mentions of ‘race’ or a specific racial
group as the racial categories, and so on. Analysis conducted by the author. The
figures are taken from the South African portion of the Southern African
Barometer project.
8 See Piombo (2002) for a full discussion of the ANC’s activities to protect its
support base during this time period.
9 A few small parties did actually organize along regional lines, such as the United
Christian Democratic Party, with the explicit purpose of advancing regional
interests. A few others, such as the African Christian Democratic Party, advanced
religious platforms. These parties, however, were extremely small and had only
limited influence. The regional nature of the NNP and DP campaigns is discussed
below.
10 Unless otherwise noted, the information in the following analyses of the parties
is drawn on detailed analyses in Piombo (2002).
11 In this analysis, a regional party is one that specifically advances regionally
focused issues rather than a party that receives most of its support from a particu-
lar region or province.
12 The information in the sections on party campaigns is taken from the author’s
interviews conducted for her dissertation. Piombo (2002) provides the full list of
interviewees and the details, dates, and other relevant information on the inter-
views.
13 This led to the exodus of liberals from the NNP, led by Roelf Meyer, who had
been chief among the reformists arguing that the NP needed to reach out to
African voters and completely recreate the organization.
14 Based on the author’s experience in South Africa from February to June, 1999.
15 Author’s interview with Danie Erasmus, DP Pretoria Campaign Coordinator, in
the DP’s North Gauteng Campaign Offices on 1 April 1999, and with Lynn Ploos
van Amstel, DP Regional Chair for KwaZulu–Natal Coastal Region, interview
in Westville, KwaZulu–Natal, on 22 April 1999.
16 Author’s interview with Mannie de Freitas, DP Youth Leader and campaign
organizer, at the DP Gauteng regional office in Mountainview, Johannesburg, on
9 March 1999.
17 Leon, media briefing reported by Malcolm Ray, ‘DP List of Leaders Released’,
The Sowetan (Johannesburg), 7 April 1999.
18 ‘Buthelezi a Hit in Shabalala Territory’, The Mercury (Durban/KwaZulu–Natal),
21 April 1997. Buthelezi in particular criticized the national government for
excessively controlling provincial governments and claimed that the lack of real
federal powers in KwaZulu–Natal had left the province in a hopeless situation.
19 In the 1996 local elections, the ANC earned significant pockets of support in
rural areas, a first ever challenge to the IFP’s control in rural KwaZulu–Natal.
20 The party published an advertisement in one of the Sunday newspapers right
before the election with this message. See Lodge (1999: 128).
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21 Such changes were proposed in 2003 after a lengthy national debate by the
Electoral Task Team appointed by the ANC government to consider electoral
system reform, but the ANC promptly rejected the proposals.
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